PREFACE

Terrorism, since post 9/11, has assumed appalling proportions in Pakistan to the extent that it very much threatens the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. It has inflicted massive damage to the country resulting in the loss of thousands of innocent lives and direct or indirect costs of billions of dollars with major impact on exports; damage to the physical infrastructure; disintegration of social structure; erosion of law and order; and blatant violation of human rights. The terrorist attack of 16 December 2014 in Peshawar galvanized the entire nation and built politico-military-citizens consensus to act decisively against terrorists. A 20 points National Action Plan on Counter-terrorism (NAP) was announced on 24 December 2014 which demonstrates national commitment to eradicate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. NAP implementation, however, continues to pose challenges because of, inter alia, policy and institutional fragmentation and coordination dysfunction; capacity deficit especially of the civilian law enforcement agencies involved in counter terrorism operations; the dearth of resources; and lack of state-citizen synergy.

In order to address some of these issues and to contribute to the effort against the multifaceted menace of terrorism, the Shahid Javed Burki Institute of Public Policy at NetSol (BIPP), in conjunction with the National School of Public Policy (NSPP), organized a two days Policy Dialogue on “Strategy for Effective Implementation of National Action Plan on Counter-terrorism: Strengthening Law Enforcement Capacity” on 8-9 May 2015. The Policy Dialogue brought all relevant stakeholders i.e., senior government officials, state security apparatus both military and civil, eminent citizens, private sector, academia and religious scholars together, who pondered over diverse facets of the issue in order to help develop an internally integrated strategy for enforcement and implementation of the National Action Plan. These deliberations culminated in the preparation of a Report which constituted the basis for producing this Strategy Document.

It may be added that this Strategy Document is the outcome of an inclusive process; and in-depth analysis of the etiology of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations with special focus on policy and institutional issues, monitoring and accountability mechanisms; state-citizen synergy; and resources dimension.
We hope that it will receive serious consideration by the government and all those involved in emancipating Pakistan from the ominous scourge of terrorism. It indeed represents BIPP’s earnest effort to contribute to the national endeavour for achieving peace and security and creating conducive environment for sustainable human development.

Shahid Najam
Vice Chairman, BIPP
July 2015
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The formulation of this Strategy Document would not have been possible without the close collaboration and help of the National School of Public Policy (NSPP), Lahore. The Rector, Mr. Ismael Qureshi and his team, deserve a special mention for facilitating and hosting the policy dialogue “Strategy for Effective Implementation of National Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism: Strengthening Law Enforcement Capacity” at the NSPP campus.

I must also record a note of deep appreciation for the lead role played by Lt. Gen (R) Khalid Maqbool, former Governor Punjab, Mr. Moeen Afzal, former Federal Secretary, Dr. Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, former Tax Ombudsman and Mr. Mohammad Sadiq, Federal Secretary, National Security Division who, with passionate zeal and commitment, stewarded the parallel Groups discussion during the course of Policy Dialogue and came up with specific set of very valuable recommendations.

Mr. Asim Imdad, a friend and colleague of yester years, was a tremendous support to organizing and conducting the event for which I owe him special thanks. The report of the policy Dialogue indeed constitutes the basis for writing the strategy document.

My colleague at the Shahid Javed Burki Institute of Public Policy at NetSol (BIPP), Muhammad Imran, extended valuable assistance in researching, coordinating and synthesizing the voluminous source of material. He took pains along with Muhammad Rizwan to organize the Strategy Document into a coherent format and shape.

The dedicated effort of Wardah Saqib, intern at BIPP, also needs to be acknowledged for data collection and promptly responding to innumerable requests for research work on various facets of terrorism.

Last but not the least, BIPP owes a debt of gratitude to Mr. Rizwan Saeed Sheikh of National Security Division for his extremely valuable comments and suggestions.

While I am immensely pleased to be a part of this endeavor, I take the full responsibility in case of any short-comings or deficits in this Strategy Document.

Shahid Najam
Vice Chairman, BIPP
July 2015
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*Strategy to Combat Terrorism including Effective Implementation of National Action Plan*
National Internal Security Policy
No Objection Certificate
Non-State Institutions
National School of Public Policy
Provincial Apex Committees
Pakistan Electronic Media Regularity Authority
Prime Minister
Rapid Response Force
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
Standard Operating Procedures
United Nations
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War on Terror
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CONTEXT
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CONTEXT

Terrorism is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon closely connected with a complex web of religious extremism and organized crime including kidnapping for ransom, drug trafficking, illegal arms trading, illicit financing etc. It is neither isolated nor a straightforward riddle; it is characterized by a perverse and radical ideology of elimination, hatred, oppression, violence and militancy in the name of religion. The trajectory to terrorism in Pakistan is especially complicated and strewn with decades of governance dysfunction, politico-religious expediency, disparate economic development, administrative lapses and law and order mismanagement. It has emerged ominously as a key threat to the national security.

Terrorism, post 9/11, has inflicted excessively high damage to Pakistan resulting in the loss of thousands of precious lives and direct or indirect costs of billions of dollars. It is estimated that in 2001-2002, the losses incurred by the country due to terrorist attacks were to the tune of $2.72 billion which rose to exorbitant levels of $4.52 billion in 2014-15 with major impact on exports, damage to the

![Chart 1: Losses Due to Terrorist Attacks](chart)

*Economic Survey of Pakistan 2015*
Apart from economic development, this menace disintegrated the social structure; destroyed the political system; eroded law and order; led to blatant violation of human rights; and inflicted tragic fatalities. More than 50,000 precious lives have been lost ever since 9/11 due to the dastardly spate of terrorist activities and religious extremism etc.

In contrast, the lackadaisical and perfunctory response to the bourgeoning terrorist threats; lack of effective policy and legislative frameworks and the associated gaps; inadequacy of institutional capacity especially that of civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs); and absence of effective coordination, monitoring and accountability mechanisms continue to remain major obstacles to combating terrorism. All these challenges have to be addressed in a concerted, comprehensive and sustainable manner with a view to protecting the geographical integrity of the country and the lives and livelihood of the
people of Pakistan against the terrorist activities.

For the purpose, the Government in conjunction with the army took a landmark decision to eradicate terrorism and their support infrastructure from the country. Zarb-e-Azb, spearheaded by the Pakistan army, was launched on 15 June 2014 in North Waziristan as a comprehensive joint military operation against the terrorists and various militant groups including Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Haqqani Group. This operation has received unprecedented support from the political leadership, media, opinion makers, the civil society and the citizens. The operation has been extremely successful in flushing out the foreign and local militants from the tribal areas and elsewhere in the country. Reportedly, more than 90% of the area which was under control of the terrorists has been cleared and secured; as of 14 June 2015,
2763 terrorists have been eliminated; and 837 hideouts/strongholds of terrorists destroyed while 347 security personnel have been martyred. The role of Pakistan army and its effective offensive has been widely acclaimed and lauded both nationally and internationally. As a result of the operation, close to one million civilians have been displaced who were provided relief, shelter, food, education and health facilities in 59 camps across Pakistan.

Later on 24 December 2014, Government announced a 20 points National Action Plan on Counter Terrorism (NAP) as unequivocal commitment to root out terrorism from the country (see Box 1). The first ever National Internal Security Policy (NISP) was earlier promulgated on 25 February 2014 to protect national interests of Pakistan by addressing critical security issues as well as concerns of the nation (see Annex I). It is based upon principles of mutual inclusiveness and integration of all national efforts and includes three elements: (i) dialogue with all stakeholders, (ii) isolation of terrorists from their support systems, and, iii) enhancing deterrence and capacity of the security apparatus to neutralize the threats to internal security of Pakistan. The Policy aims at establishing the writ of the state; protect life, property and fundamental rights of the citizens; promote pluralism, freedom, democracy and culture of tolerance; prevent threats to internal security; and resolve dispute with hostile elements peacefully without compromising rule of law.

It needs to be recognized that combating terrorism not only entails swift and effective military action but also involves establishment of stable and sustainable environment. A combination of policy and institutional frameworks has to be put in place to promote freedom and human dignity; democracy and inclusiveness; and creation of opportunities for people to exercise and expand their development choices including their access to basic needs: food, education, health, housing etc. At the same time a robust alternative to the terrorists’ authoritarian vision and modus operandi has to be provided to the people to enable them make a rational choice for their future and the future generations to come. This, a priori, requires, apart from state security apparatus, the use of political, diplomatic, financial, governance and criminal administration justice system to combat, disrupt and destroy the terrorist networks, their radical ideology and evolving threats. It is, as such, imperative that instead of piecemeal, reactive, ad-hoc and sub-optimal interventions, a coherent strategy for effective implementation of counter terrorism action plan is formulated through inclusive, holistic and system-wide approach.

** Express Tribune. A year on, 2,763 militants killed in Operation Zarb-e-Azb: ISPR. By Web Desk Published: June 13, 2015. The article can be accessed through the following link: http://tribune.com.pk/story/903004/a-year-on-2763-militants-killed-in-operation-zarb-e-azb-ispr/
Box 1
National Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism

The 20-point National Action Plan on counter-terrorism was announced by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a televised address to the nation late Wednesday night following a day-long meeting of the heads of all parliamentary parties at the PM House.

In his televised address, the Prime Minister said that the December 16 Peshawar school massacre has drawn a line between 'coward' terrorists and the Pakistani nation. "A line has been drawn. On one side are coward terrorists and on the side stands the whole nation," he said.

The Prime Minister detailed 20 points of terrorism action plan in speech which are as follows:
1. Implementation of death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism.
2. Special trial courts under the supervision of Army. The duration of these courts would be two years.
3. Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country.
4. NACTA, the anti-terrorism institution will be strengthened.
5. Strict action against the literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, decapitation, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance.
6. All funding sources of terrorists and terrorist outfits will be frozen.
7. The defunct outfits will not be allowed to operate under any other name.
8. Establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force.
9. End to religious extremism and protection of minorities will be ensured.
10. Registration and regulation of religious seminaries.
11. Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organisations through print and electronic media.
12. Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPs.
13. Communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely.
14. Concrete measures against promotion of terrorism through internet and social media.
15. No room will be left for the extremism in any part of the country.
16. Ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical end.
17. Balochistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders.
18. Action against elements spreading sectarianism.
19. Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees.
20. Reforms in criminal courts system to strengthen the anti-terrorism institutions including provincial CID.
Section II
CHALLENGES
Section II
CHALLENGES

In recent years, especially post 9/11, the terrorist networks have progressively evolved moving away from centralized command and control structure and predominant dependency on state sponsorship to operating as non-state actors. They have diversified from the organized terrorism to the splinter groups and/or the individuals and affiliates using both physical and cyber space and technologies. Terrorist acts cover a wide spectrum including hard core terrorism, attacks against the state security apparatus, religious extremism, organized crime, ethnic cleansing, political separatism and have exacted a devastating impact on the safety and security of Pakistanis. The porous borders and interconnected international systems - finance, communication, transit- have extended the reach of terrorists to every corner of the globe not to speak of their extensive operational tentacles within the boundaries of individual countries. (See Box 2 for major challenges.)
Box 2
Challenges

• Terrorist networks have become more dispersed and decentralized with more reliance on smaller outfits inspired by a common ideology.
• Despite severe and effective military action to de-capacitate the terrorist organizations and destroy their safe havens and command and control structures, the terrorists’ threats continue to loom large and find not too infrequent expression in almost all the provinces of Pakistan;
• In the extra-territorial context, Afghanistan’s lack of operational capacity to root out terrorist strongholds from the country continues to pose imminent threat of terrorism and organized crime. The recent proliferation of “Al Daesh” in Afghanistan and their conflict with Afghan Taliban to gain the space is a cause of serious concern;
• Some of the so called friendly countries and their citizens and faith based organizations, in the unbridled pursuit of propagating their version of Islam, continue to foment and finance the sectarian based ideology and establishments which invariably lead to religious extremism and acts of violence;
• India’s overt and covert support and sponsorship to terrorist activities inside Pakistan to destabilize the country and externally to demonize Pakistan as a safe haven and breeding ground for terrorists remains a major threat.
• The social media and the Internet serve as potent tools for the terrorists to communicate and spread their perverse messages and ideology; muster support from the well wishers and those indoctrinated or persuaded by their ideology; and recruit, train and operate the personnel without risking personal contact;
• Terrorists in the face of effective military action, are constantly changing their modus operandi and continue to seek support from transnational extremist entities, networks, and individuals for realizing their ideological ends;
• The national consensus, resolve and commitment to eradicate terrorism after the 16 December 2014 deadliest terrorist attack on the Army Public School Peshawar killing 145 people (including 132 school children) needs to be sustained through credible and result oriented actions both on the military front as well as political front;
• The rehabilitation of close to one million people forced to leave their homes in the wake of Zab-e-Azb; reconstruction of the infrastructure; and rejuvenation of the socio-economic activities pose a daunting challenge to the government which must be addressed through tangible political and financial commitments. The process which commenced as of 31 March 2015 should be completed earliest possible accompanied by participatory and inclusive socio-economic development interventions.
Section III
THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Section III
THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Terrorism has lately assumed a very complex and multifaceted proportion. In addition to the sufferings and afflictions in the shape of loss of innocent lives and diminution of livelihood assets and infrastructure, these attacks are a direct assault on the fundamental human rights, values of democracy and rule of law. As such, the State must make use of all its arsenal, might and power and deploy all the resources at its command, together with the active cooperation of the citizens, to prevent and eradicate terrorist activities. At the same time, the possibility of abuse and indiscriminate use of power and resources has to be prevented to safeguard the fundamental rights of the citizens and comply with the canons of international law. A set of guidelines is imperative to reconcile the need for resolute and severe action against the terrorist and the protection of human rights and values of freedom and democracy:

• First and foremost, protect and safeguard the integrity of the nation state of Pakistan as fundamental imperative;
• Ensure conformity to the constitutional principles including protection of civil rights and civil liberties and at the same time uphold the constitutional system to ensure rule of law and implement the writ of the state;
• Protect the life, property and dignity of the citizens by revamping counter terrorism architecture and pooling all the national resources including legal instruments, law enforcement, intelligence, military, political and diplomatic capacities.
• Ensure fairness, justice and uniformity in application of law to create and maintain public trust and credibility;
• Not to condone, either due to religious or political expediency or personality cult, acts of terrorism or deliberate targeting of innocent lives;
• Familiarize with the political, religious and social beliefs of the terrorists to understand the motive for violent extremism and address the root cause rather than dealing with the symptom;
• Develop effective and compelling counter terrorism narrative to negate the perverse and radical terrorist ideology;
• Develop the central unified institutional capacity and effective mechanism to design, implement and deliver high quality, effective and innovative counter terrorism action plans to prevent, curb and eradicate terrorism;
• Ensure transparency in communicating with the citizens to elicit their buy-in;
Section III: The Guiding Principles

- Provide adequate resources-human, financial and systemic to law enforcement agencies to effectively combat terrorism;
- The use of security apparatus to fight terrorism to be accompanied by: appropriate policy and legislative frameworks; pluralist and democratic institutions at local level; and, the context specific socio-economic uplift program for sustainable development;
- Initiate and implement compensatory policies and safety net programs through targeted interventions to help the affected population, IDPs, and the poor segments;
- Prevent the terrorists from establishing safe havens and deny them the financial, material and manpower support from both inside the country and outside.

Box 3
Methodology

The Shahid Javed Burki Institute at NetSol in conjunction with the National School of Public Policy organized a two day high level “Policy Dialogue on Strategy for Effective Implementation of National Action Plan on Counter-terrorism: Strengthening Law Enforcement Capacity” on 8-9 May 2015 at NSPP main campus. In all 47 participants, representing the major stakeholders i.e., senior government officials, state security apparatus both military and civil, eminent citizens, private sector, academia and religious scholars attended and enriched the policy dialogue with their perspectives both on the etiology of terrorism and prescriptions to address the complex phenomenon of terrorism. In order to facilitate focused decision, BIPP and NSPP followed the following format and methodology:

- Background discussion papers were prepared around four important threads related to terrorism:
  1. Building blocks of capacity development including policy and institutional dimensions;
  2. Mobilizing and effectively employing resources for strengthening law enforcement function;
  3. Monitoring and accountability mechanisms
  4. Citizen-law enforcement interface and government-security organizations
- The NSPP Syndicate work of early May 2015 on terrorism was also provided to the participants as background material;

Structure

- Four Groups around the four threads were constituted for parallel sessions. The membership of these Groups was on a voluntary basis which selected their own leaders and rapporteurs;
- The first day was devoted by the Groups to the etiology and diagnosis of the problem of terrorism; while the second half day to the prescription and recommendations.
- For symmetry and uniformity in the conduct of Group work, an agreed template was followed by the Groups for presenting their recommendations;
- Presentations by the Group leaders, embodying specific recommendations, were discussed in the Plenary for general consensus.

Strategy Formulation

- Based on the proceedings and recommendations, a Report was prepared by BIPP in consultation with NSPP and Group Leaders.
- The Report constituted the basis for BIPP to formulate the Strategy Document for implementation of National Action Plan and dealing with the complex phenomenon of terrorism.
Section IV
THE STRATEGY
Section IV
THE STRATEGY

Terrorism poses a serious threat to the peace and security of Pakistan and its people. The country has been assiduously engaged, especially after 11 September, in a war against terrorism which has put at gross peril the territorial integrity of Pakistan, the security and safety of people and national assets as well as the sustainability of the livelihood assets of the people. This war has to be fought, inter alia, on many fronts: through effective military action to destroy the terrorists and their infrastructure; through ideological offensive to produce a compelling narrative to counter the religiously distorted perverse vision of the terrorists (see Box 4); through diplomatic efforts to isolate the terrorists form their external nexus and supporters and disrupt their operations mounted directly or indirectly from foreign soils; through political mediation to integrate the alienated and estranged segments in the decision processes; and through socio-economic interventions to ensure sustainable development of the historically neglected tribal areas and other deprived pockets and segments of the country.

Indeed the destiny of the country hinges upon how effectively and collectively Pakistanis, as a nation, join hands and heads together to combat this threat and create for themselves and the future generations a peaceful and prosperous Pakistan for the well being of the citizenry. While both NAP and NISP represent national consensus and resolve to root out terrorism, there is an urgent need to embark on a strategy to ensure effective implementation of these frameworks; to prevent and eradicate terrorism in all its forms; to protect the lives and assets of the people; to rigorously pursue the terrorists including those associated with religious sectarianism, organized crime and deliberate acts of violence; and, to establish comprehensive response mechanisms to deal with the terrorists attacks.

The strategy must address all the facets of terrorism; elicit collective effort and commitment fully involving the citizens and the interest groups, the non-state and state actors, the civil and military establishments, the media and academia and the politicians and civil servants at the local, sub-national and national levels; and pool totality of intellectual, physical, social and financial resources to counter the nefarious designs and machinations of the terrorists and their supporters. The orthodox and hackneyed ways of dealing with the terrorists will not yield sustainable results; a paradigm shift both at the policy level as well as operational level will be required to effectively counter terrorism.
Box 4
A Counter-Narrative

The terrorists construct and draw strength of their narrative from strong traditions, historical heritage and Dars-e-Nizami curriculum rich in philosophy; logic; Greek, Roman and Islamic ideologies; laws of rhetoric and speech; as well as religion. Their narrative, despite a perverse ideology and distorted vision, does embody internal energy and persuasive power to attract people, especially the misguided youth to their fold who perceive the existing social, political and economic order characterized by injustice, alienation, disempowerment, tyranny and oppression.

The challenge for counter narrative, therefore, is to come up with the level of rigor, morality, evidence, knowledge and intellectual depth that surpasses and over-powers the ‘Terrorists’ narrative based on radicalism, violence and militancy. It has to be extremely persuasive and convincing to fully satisfy the mental quest especially of the youth as to what the real “truth” and system of ideas, values and beliefs which the humanity in its entirety espouses. The counter-narrative must present a evidence as to allay the general sense of disempowerment and lack of engagement in establishing a just and fair socio-political and economic order.

In this connection, the commandments of the Holy Quran and the “Ahadiths” and character of Holy Prophet (PBUH) as a role model present a very authentic, potent, inspiring and convincing basis to construct the counter narrative. While tyranny and injustice were widely pervasive in the world, Islam brought with it a great deal of moral, intellectual, cultural, political, economic and social revolution which elicited best in man and suppressed the worst. This revolution developed and nurtured the moral excellence in the conduct of day to day affairs and in the inter-personal and inter-faith relationship. Deep sense of morality, character and brotherhood established an order which replaced chaos with harmony; bloodshed with peace; in-tolerance with tolerance; barbarity with humanism; wickedness with piety; tyranny with justice; ignorance with constant quest for knowledge; and selfishness with selflessness. Some of the elements of this narrative thus could be:

- Islam as the religion of peace and “Etida’al”;
- Universalism as signified by Allah being the sole Creator and Sovereign of the entire humanity;
- Equality of human beings in terms of no superiority of an Arab over the non-Arab; white over the black; the superiority is only by virtue of righteousness, character, conduct and Taqwa;
- Tolerance and peaceful co-existence with those of other religions and minorities; and non-compulsiveness and non-coercion in religion;
- The sanctity of human life in that killing of one human being is tantamount to killing the entire humanity; and saving one life is like saving the whole humanity;
- Spreading mischief in the land is like slewing the whole humanity; and condemnation of groups and mischief mongers causing disorder in the society;
- Supremacy of the Constitutional principles:
  1. Supremacy of the law of the land and rule of law;
  2. Respect for fundamental human rights including those of children, women, minorities and those pertaining to religion, worship and deprived segments;
  3. State’s responsibility to address militancy and violence;
  4. Security and safety of the person and property of citizens;

This counter-narrative needs to be articulated through a robust, empirical and scientific research involving socio-economic and ethno-political landscape. The Ministry of Religious Affairs in conjunction with the Provincial Governments; the reputed research and knowledge centers; the religious scholars; and the well renowned faith based organizations should take the lead in producing this counter narrative. The full and unflinching political ownership at the highest level along with citizens’ inclusive buy-in are the key elements for the successful propagation of the counter narrative.
This strategy attempts to serve the above outlined purpose. It is fully anchored in the National Internal Security Policy and the National Action Plan on Counter-terrorism and benefits from a very rich and intensive policy dialogue involving eminent citizens, senior government and non-government officials, high ranking civil and military personnel, reputed representative of media and academia, religious scholars and politicians and policy experts and development practitioners.

1. Strategic Pillars and Action Areas

The strategy is constructed around 5 Pillars: Hard Core Terrorism; Religions Extremism and Militancy; Organized Crime; Technology, Training and Work Force Development; and, Law Enforcement. Each pillar comprises four sets of action areas around: (a) Policy and Institutional Development; (b) Monitoring and Accountability; (c) State-Citizen Synergy and (d) Resource Mobilization which are briefly described below:

(a) Policy and Institutional Development

The policy process and institutional mechanisms in Pakistan to combat terrorism are characterized by fragmentation and incoherence. In the past 60 years, ad hoc, insecurity-induced desire and myopic vision to transform the institutions led to the replacement of existing institutions or establishing the parallel institutions. In the process, institutions, especially those of executive administration and criminal justice system, have been severely compromised or grossly diluted in terms of the dispersal of the executive magisterial enforcement function which massively debilitated the capacity of the state to enforce its writ and establish rule of law.

The increasing imbalance in the civil-military relationship especially on the issues concerning the national security, both at decision making as well as institutional levels, has further aggravated the situation. This asymmetry finds significant expression in the squeezing of space for civilian LEAs to carry out their mandate and in the progressive denudation of their operational capability over the years. This historical imbalance, which has been primarily engendered by the weakness of the successive political leaderships, the fragility of the political institutions, inaction by the government on vital security issues and the poor governance of civilian security apparatus, created a vacuum which was filled by the military establishment. The military readily assumed ascendancy not only in setting the policy agenda for external and internal security but also charting the course for Pakistan's external relations especially with the super powers and country's neighbours. While this might have been expedient and ad hoc response to the huge policy and institutional void, it cannot be a sustainable solution from a long term perspective given the scale, size and magnitude of the security and terrorism related problems. This imbalance and asymmetry has to be rectified by consciously embarking on the policy processes and institutional mechanisms with the civilian authorities taking the
leadership. This, a priori, entails strengthening the democratic institutions; good governance; and respect for professionalism in the functioning of the civilian LEAs on the one hand, and, on the other a realization and commitment by the military to the effect that after achieving the short term gains by use of force, ultimately, civilian led, peace and development driven and consultative process is much more viable and workable option to finding sustainable solutions.

In the wake of proliferation of terrorist attacks, the government has since initiated serious efforts to establish mechanisms for improved coordination among the agencies involved in countering terrorism. In March 2013, a National Counter-terrorism Authority (NACTA) was established to devise counter terrorism strategy and to help integrate and coordinate counter-terrorism efforts among various agencies. NACTA is governed by a Board headed by the Prime Minister and comprising a number of federal and provincial ministers and heads of all law enforcement and intelligence agencies. However, this body which lies at the heart of NISP and NAP implementation and was designed to rectify the lack of coordination and fragmentation of effort in the fight against terrorism, continues to remain functionally ineffective owing to aforesaid civil-military relationship asymmetry as well as financial, structural and procedural problems. Given the urgency, enormity and complexity of the multi-faceted terrorism problem, it is a matter of absolute high priority that NACTA is made fully functional as apex national authority to combat terrorism. The bottlenecks and problematic issues including structural and design modification, respective roles and responsibilities of the civilian and military counter terrorism agencies, their relationship and interaction both horizontal and vertical, the modus operandi and standardized operating procedures, the decision and consultation processes etc., need to be tabled, discussed and resolved in a transparent manner in the best national interest to endow and vest NACTA with necessary financial and functional autonomy. There is an extensive and elaborate set of agencies and institutions involved in combating terrorism as is evident from the chart. There has to be a central coordination authority to synergize and maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations to achieve sustainable results. NACTA provides that forum and mechanism.

In All Parties Conference (APC) of 2 January 2015, the political and military leadership of Pakistan unanimously agreed to the formation of military courts to expedite disposal of terrorism related cases through amendment in the Constitution, the Protection of Pakistan Act (2014), The Navy Ordinance (1961), The Air Force Act (1953) and The Army Act (1952). The establishment of the Special Trial Courts with two years duration under the supervision of Army for speedy trial of the terrorists as an extra-ordinary measure seems justifiable in the short run given the unprecedented threat and risk to the territorial integrity of Pakistan. But equally important, if not more, is the post special trial courts scenario. This palpably
Chart 2
Structure of Counter-Terrorism Agencies

Federal Government

NACTA

Gilgit Baltistan Government
Gilgit-Baltistan Police

Azad Kashmir Government
Azad Kashmir Police

Punjab Police
Sindh Police
KPK Police
Balochistan Police

Frontier Corps: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa FC, Balochistan FC

Frontier Constabulary

Ministry of Narcotics Control
Anti-Narcotics Force

Ministry of Communication
National Highway and Motorway Police

Ministry of Defense
Airport Security Force

Ministry of Railways
Railway Police

Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts

Federal Investigating Agency

National Police Bureau

National Public Safety Commission
National Police Management Board

Ministry of Interior

Inter-Service Intelligence

Intelligence Bureau

Ministry of Railways
Railway Police

Pakistan Rangers, Punjab Rangers, Sindh Rangers

Pakistan Maritime Security Agency

Capital Territory Police (Islamabad)

National Counterterrorism Authority
brings out the need to strengthen the normal judicial system and anti-terrorism institutions; reform the criminal courts system; explore the possibility of restoring the executive magistracy for conflict prevention and resolution, interest mediation and above all enforcement of writ of the state to address the problem on a sustainable basis.

The Government, in January 2015, also formed Provincial Apex Committees (PACs) in all the provinces to monitor security, refer cases of terror suspects to the Federal Government and implement the National Action Plan (NAP). The Committees comprise both military and political leadership headed by the Provincial Chief Ministers. The whole hearted participation of the political and military leadership and complete harmony among all intelligence and law enforcement agencies at every level constitute the conditions precedent for the success of the Apex Committees. It may be added that out of 20-points NAP, only 5-points are the Federal component while 15-points pertain to the provincial component. This in itself speaks volumes of the role of the Provincial Governments and the Apex Committees in eliminating extremism and terrorism at the grass roots level. However, these Apex Committees have not been able to contribute significantly to the NAP implementation despite meeting off and on. Instead, they have drawn criticism in terms of their ‘extended role’ and functioning as parallel governments in the absence of clearly defined rules of engagement.

In the larger policy and institutional context, the capacity issues within the individual agencies remain a major challenge including institutional preparedness, early warning and information and intelligence systems, policy and operational coordination, unified system-wide perspective on terror and related crimes prevention etc. Effective law enforcement and establishment of rule of law, a priori, entail empowered, adequately provided (systems, tools and equipment etc.) and functional institutions with competent, motivated and committed personnel to fight terrorism; mitigate the damage of terrorist attacks, ensure speedy recovery of the victims and ultimately succeed in ridding the society of this menace.

Pakistan has witnessed haphazard proliferation of legislation without being anchored in a consolidated and comprehensive policy framework, especially in the field of counter-terrorism. There is thus a need for a comprehensive legislative package on national security that would revise the relevant existing laws and provide new legislation for areas inadequately addressed at present. This legislative package must be evolved through an inclusive approach comprising both immediate measures to counter the threat faced by Pakistan, and longer term measures aimed at improving the underlying criminal justice system and de-radicalization initiatives.

There is already a considerable compendium of existing policy, legal and regulatory frameworks which as immediate measure and
with the necessary adjustments, constitute a robust basis to deal with terrorism and associated crimes. Of particular attention and enforcement action are policies on freezing and controlling all funding sources of terrorists and terror outfits; severe action against militant and armed gangs; registration and regulatory frameworks for religious seminaries and effective implementation of ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organizations and on spread of literature promoting hatred or extremism. Law must not spare those irrespective of their political or religious clout who encourage militancy, extremism and hatred.

A list of the related laws is attached (see Annex II) which need to be studied to eliminate duality or inconsistency; to be enforced in conjunction; and to be applied uniformly to deter, prevent and inflict severe punishments on all those guilty of terrorism or abetting terrorism. There are also International Conventions and Protocols most of which have been endorsed and adopted by Pakistan. The government should fully benefit from these and develop concrete vertical linkages to further enhance the efficacy of the national legal and policy frameworks. A list of the selected international Conventions and Protocols is attached (see Annex III).

At the same time, important issues like development of the community based institutions; the role of education system especially the Madrissahs; the rapid expansion of youth and their absorption in the labour market; and the role of families in nurturing the character of children to prevent their drift into terrorism, require utmost state and societal attention. A holistic policy and institutional framework must also incorporate within it the spatial dimension especially the tribal belt adjoining Pakistan and Afghanistan which has been a safe haven and command and control centre of the terrorist organizations. The strategy must integrate a concept of "joint action" not only in terms of military intervention but equally important in terms of socio-economic development to emancipate the area from scourge of poverty, ignorance and alienation.

(b) Monitoring and Accountability

Law enforcement is paralyzed in an environment of mistrust and allegations of corruption, shadiness, misappropriation and politicization. An effective and transparent monitoring and accountability mechanism covering the three dimensions-inward, upward and downward-is sine qua non to take care of internal integrity of law enforcement apparatus and help build an environment of trust for dealing with crime and terrorism.

The strategy must provide for transparent internal monitoring. This could be easily achieved if senior positions especially the heads of law enforcement organizations are appointed on merit and are allowed to operate independently as per the relevant laws and internal rules and regulations. With the ever-changing appointments, transfers and political maneuvering, not much is left by means of internal monitoring within the hierarchy of law
enforcement; contrarily it badly damages law enforcement agencies’ credibility and capability to perform its core functions of detecting and preventing crime.

As earlier mentioned, the recently established NACTA has the mandate to coordinate all law enforcement institutions and can perform the overall monitoring of the law enforcement function. At the same time, conscious effort needs to be made to inculcate a sense of accountability in the state security apparatus to the formal oversight mechanisms and to the civil society including their duty to protect the citizens as well human rights.

The existing executive monitoring mechanisms should also be re-activated. The Home Departments in all provinces have assumed a passive role in holding law enforcement apparatus accountable to executive authority. Home Secretary’s review function is hardly ever used in matters like deaths in custody and encounters, increasing crime rate, excesses of law enforcement apparatus, jails as breeding grounds of criminals and terrorists or increasing incidents of terrorism. While, this is the situation at the provincial level, there is a huge dearth of executive accountability authority over law enforcement apparatus at the district level. Sound and strong, effective executive accountability mechanisms over law enforcement apparatus like restoration of executive magistracy must be present at the sub-divisional and district levels in order for law enforcement agencies to achieve results in curbing terrorism.

The legislative oversight is also a powerful mode of ensuring law enforcement results; bringing the performance of law enforcers into limelight; and obliging them to respond to queries publically and perform their duties in transparent manner. However, politicization in the garb of legislative oversight needs to be effectively checked. For law enforcers to fight and curb terrorism, it is necessary that legislative oversight is exercised judiciously, meaningfully, and in a manner targeted toward crime prevention and detection.

The judicial accountability again, as a very important component of criminal justice system, has stake in ensuring reduction in crime and prevention of terrorism. It has over the years been reduced to minimal with the result that the law enforcement apparatus faces a handicap in enforcing the laws; becomes directionless; and is confronted with operational confusion in the use of its own powers and authorities. The strategy must incorporate judicial oversight in ensuring a direction and proper procedure for enforcement of law and prevention of terrorism.

The role of non-State Institutions including the freedom of press and electronic media with appropriate standards for responsible reporting by journalists serves as a potent monitoring and accountability mechanism. However, media, despite being independent and free, has to exercise caution and restraint and act responsibly keeping in view the urgency and dictates of effectively combating terrorism. It is particularly so with reference to the much trumpeted issue of terrorists' narrative and need for the counter-narrative. The space afforded to the terrorist's narrative may be justifiable from the journalistic standpoint but...
needs to be prudently weighed from a higher ethical plain in terms of the practical impact of its role. A hyper-active and dramatic media is likely to intimidate and stifle the initiative and actions of a nation state at the forefront of global counter-terrorism effort. There are many examples in the contemporary world even of those countries which claim to be the champions of press freedom where the national security needs are integrated and enforced and even voluntarily adhered to by the media. The Pakistani media has to be sensitized and at the same time itself evolve a code of practice, ethics and conduct which allows the state to effectively carry out its responsibility to combat terrorism without being unnecessarily put to media trial.

The Human Rights Organizations, NGOs and CSOs could also play key role in the promotion of good governance and rule of law thereby contributing to well targeted and orchestrated action against terrorists. A transparency and accountability portal could also be instituted to allow the citizens as a single point of reference how the state security apparatus is performing to control and curb crime and terrorism.

(c) State-citizens synergy

The citizens-law enforcement interface on the one hand and government-security apparatus relations on the other are of crucial significance in dealing with the complexity and scale of the phenomena of terrorism. The vital importance of the citizens’ engagement and the key role which they are capable of playing in the upstream and downstream processes, especially concerning law enforcement and establishing rule of law has not received much attention in Pakistan. The "general public" has historically been treated as passive recipient or object: a shapeless, forceless, aimless blob of flesh and blood with no defined rights, duties and equality of status. This greatly hampers law enforcement especially in the face of a differential application of law and its process. The general perception is that those who wield power because of money, might or authority tend to get away even for major violations and crimes while the rights of a common citizen are flouted ad nauseum. This leads to alienation of citizens and huge credibility gap between the law enforcement agencies and citizens.

Against this backdrop, it is essential to seek citizens' full confidence, commitment and involvement from agenda setting through design and implementation stages to the monitoring and evaluation of the results to combat terrorism. Top-down techno-bureaucratic processes alone are not enough to achieve adequate, equitable and sustainable results. The inclusiveness and participation of the citizens in designing the policy and legislative frameworks as well as operational and implementation measures secures their buy-in is essential as it ensures that (a) the grant of the extra ordinary national security powers against acts of terrorism is a conscious collective decision; (b) the use of extra ordinary powers against groups of foreign belligerents and the local terrorists is legitimate; (c) the danger of militarizing the country as well as abuse of these powers to the detriment of the citizens can be eliminated; (d) the fundamental constitutional rights including those of minorities and marginalized...
groups will be respected and protected; and (e) they have a duty to actively play their role in assisting the government to combat terrorism.

It may also be pointed out that while the educated classes of the society have some basic knowledge of Islamic ideology and Islam’s sectarian profile, it does not prepare them for standing up against the “METS” (militancy, extremism, terrorism and sectarianism) phenomenon. This is especially true for those directly involved in the War on Terror (WOT) on behalf of the state. The need for capacity building of members of the civil services, armed forces, LEAs, civic society, policy makers and parliaments in this regard cannot be over emphasized.

As for the government-security apparatus relationship, as earlier stated it has all along been characterized by asymmetry with regards to both the civilian and military security organizations. The weakness and fragility of political institutions and army’s frequent excursions into the political arena are primarily responsible for this imbalance. The civilian security machinery especially the police has also suffered over the years because of massive politicization thus weakening its command and control structure; compromising the quality of its HR; and, eroding public confidence in it as just, fair and efficient institution. There are other vitally important issues which must be addressed to maximize the state-citizen synergy in all out effort against terrorism, militancy and religious extremism:

• The perspective of the governance and law enforcement agencies to view the population they serve as the general public needs to be changed as this labeling strips the citizens of their rights and duties as individuals and creates an anonymous right-less mass with no clear identities and social status.

• The social construct of law enforcers as more equal than the fellow citizens which seeps deep in the functioning of law enforcers making them oblivious of their responsibility toward and accountability to the people, has to be transformed to "duty to serve and protect" and "responsive toward citizens" motto.

• Mechanisms and forums to involve the citizens should be institutionalized to create synergy between the state's security and law enforcement apparatus and the citizens. A participatory approach and systematic communication deepens a culture of regular citizen-government interaction and facilitates an open and inclusive national dialogue on policy options; helps manage expectations; promotes transparency and accountability; and fosters a culture of tolerance, co-existence as opposed to extremism.

• Religious extremism located in the Pashtun and Saraiki belts also have ethnic dimension of identity politics, which need to be discussed and taken into account while making decisions about dealing with them.

• The rural-urban differential and distinctiveness in violence and extremisms, of which the law enforcement agencies were at times oblivious, needs to be tackled with a different set of strategy and modus operandi.
• The grievance narrative in Karachi and Baluchistan, and to a lesser extent in the Saraiki and Hazara belts as well as tribal areas find a large, main-stream receptive audience. This has to be countered with tangible inclusive actions at the politico-economic front.

(d) Resource Mobilization

Adequate resources and budgetary commitments are essential to counter terrorism and reduce Pakistan’s vulnerability to terrorist attack. In fact, the magnitude of threat posed by terrorism requires out-of-box thinking to mobilize sufficient resources on a strategic and sustainable bases; it entails looking beyond the traditional public financing. The efficient use of existing resources could also make a visible difference in the performance of law enforcement agencies against terrorism. In recent years funding for law enforcement in all forms: purchase of equipment and vehicles, gear and weapons, buildings, computers and software has taken a quantum leap when compared with the past many years. However, the quality of service has not substantially improved. One of the key reasons is the lack of effective utilization of available resource which is lost through pilferage, waste and corruption while a significant part, instead of augmenting the law enforcement function, is allocated to the protective protocol duties and privileges. There is, therefore, a dire need to ensure, on the one hand, efficient and transparent utilization of resources and, on the other, accountable and need based allocation with priority on maximizing the reduction in vulnerability to terrorist attacks and keeping all conceivable threats at the minimal level based on the greatest benefits to the citizens. Quantifying the probability of threat and its gravity, as such, should constitute the basis for resource allocation.

Moreover, in pursuit of its ambitious socio-economic development agenda and mega development projects, government, at times, opts for budgetary reductions and in the process, the law enforcement function faces a corresponding crunch. A minimum threshold needs to be prescribed for this sector’s financing every year based, inter alia, on the evolving law and order challenges including those posed by terrorism.

Community policing is not a novel idea and has been tested and tried in many countries. The Citizens-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) model adopted in Karachi also provides some valuable insights into how such model can work in Pakistan. More recently, some of the private/public housing colonies have developed neighborhood watch initiatives. There is a need to support and replicate such initiatives at a wider scale so as to ensure that respective communities take an active role in preventing crime and reporting suspicious activities and characters who are likely to engage or abet terrorism. This would take undue burden off the police force and other crime-fighting agencies and help avail complementary resources.

In the realm of curbing terrorism, intangible resources such as linkages in and trust of community, matter more than ever. Many a crimes are prevented and reported prior to being committed, if law enforcement apparatus
is viewed as a part of the local community. In addition, utilizing resources and offices to bring the community together, to strengthen social bonds and utilize the social capital in fighting crime and terrorism can be an effective strategy for law enforcement. Community level linkages also provide an informal system of checks and balances against excesses committed by law enforcement apparatus. It also serves to integrate larger social community in the fight against crime and terrorism.

The possibility of cooperating with the private sector for resource mobilization holds enormous potential and should be actively explored. This has two dimensions. Firstly many fiscal crimes create parallel economies, and foment illicit financing, money laundering and tax evasion. Terrorist organizations most benefit from such financing. Secondly, such activities often happen at the expense of legitimate tax-compliant industries and sectors. Many a times, these sectors try to work with government in addressing market distortions so as to create level playing field for legitimate businesses. There is a need to formalize and encourage such arrangements to seek additional resources and support to fight such crimes and terrorism.

Lack of incentives and low pay packages is also a problem not just limited to law enforcement agencies but also the public sector at large. In the absence of any incentive, the law enforcement officials tend to underperform, dragging down the overall organizational performance. Evidence suggests that any performance-incentive alignment can substantially improve the performance of public sector agencies. Government of Punjab for instance has recently undertaken a pilot to reward excise and taxation officials, resulting in improved collection of revenues. Similarly Federal Board of Revenue has recently amended some of its reward rules to ensure that performance is duly recognized and rewarded. There is a need to scale up such efforts and ensure that law enforcement agencies personnel have a fair reward for improving their performance and per unit productivity.

In recent years, a number of international, multilateral and bilateral donors have taken interest in financing the anti-terrorism efforts and upgrading the law enforcement sector. These resources could be accessed through effective coordination and synergy for preparing an integrated law enforcement sector development plan.

2. Pakistan at the Forefront of WoT

There is an additional aspects which has not been fully projected and propagated so far to the world i.e., the extra-ordinary role of Pakistan as a front-line country in fighting war on terror to save the entire world from this lethal menace. Pakistan’s consistent efforts and huge sacrifices indeed have not been recognized nor appreciated by the world at large. Instead of being apologetic and defensive, Pakistan should speak from point of strength and high moral ground and demonstrate to the world (a) the successes it
has achieved; (b) its operational efficacy and excellence in combating terrorism; (c) its experiential first hand learning of what worked and what did not work against the terrorist; and above all (d) the need to understand the root causes including socio-cultural and anthropological aspects to eradicate terrorism. Pakistan’s experience could be of tremendous assistance to the rest of the world and especially countries confronting terrorism and religious extremism.

3. Vision

To prevent and eradicate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations to make Pakistan safe and secure; uphold liberty and dignity of the citizens; and pursue people-centered and rights-based development approach for the well being of all.

4. Mission

To protect the citizens, their assets and the critical infrastructure from terrorism; mitigate and degrade acts of terrorism in the short term by denying the militants to resurrect and reorganize; and, in the long term, through the instruments of good governance and rule of law, establish a tolerant and enlightened society to eliminate future recurrence of incidence of violence, militancy and terrorism.

5. Objectives

a) Short-Term:

• To make full use of all mechanisms and instruments of state power and security apparatus to eradicate, kill or capture the terrorists including the leadership, command formations and foot soldiers;
• To destroy the safe havens, sanctuaries and networks of the terrorists and deny them the ability to re-establish and access these;
• To establish rule of law and ensure its uniform application without succumbing to religious or political expediency;
• To strengthen security of the key installations and likely terrorist targets thus deterring the terrorists from their wanton acts;
• To intensify fight against the organized crime connected with terrorism including money laundering, illicit financing, drug and arms smuggling, human trafficking etc., with a view to effectively curbing and controlling their incidence;
• To squeeze and terminate funding, including domestic and foreign resources, of terrorist activities either in the name of religion or radical ideology for which the use of diplomatic channels and international cooperation is absolute imperative.

b) Long-term

• To establish legislative, policy and planning frameworks along with the good governance to establish a free, empowered, enlightened and tolerant society living harmoniously and believing in co-existence;
• To establish and promote local pluralist and democratic institutions capable of giving people the voice; aggregating their preferences; and responding to their needs
in a responsible and responsive manner;
- To develop people-centered, needs based social and economic development programmes through inclusive and participatory process and ensure equitable access of all to basic social services;
- To empower politically, economically, socially and culturally the citizens including the marginalized groups, women and youth to exercise and expand their choices with freedom and dignity.

**Chart 3**

- **HARD CORE TERRORISM**
  - Policy and Institutional Development
  - Monitoring and Accountability

- **ORGANIZED CRIME**
  - Resource Mobilisation Strategy

- **RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM**
  - State-Citizen Synergy

- **TECHNOLOGY, TRAINING, WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT**

- **LAW ENFORCEMENT**
Section V
STRATEGIC PILLARS

Pillar I: Hard Core Terrorism
Pillar 2: Religious Extremism and Militancy
Pillar 3: Organized Crime
Pillar 4: Technology, Training and Workforce Development
Pillar 5: Law Enforcement

While the recommendations go much beyond the scope of National Action Plan, they do also refer in the last column of the Strategy Matrix to address the specific action points envisaged under NAP

The Number of Recommendations by Strategic Pillars and Action Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Pillars</th>
<th>Policy and Institutional Development</th>
<th>Monitoring and Accountability</th>
<th>Citizen/Government Synergy</th>
<th>Resource Mobilization</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Pillar I: Hard Core Terrorism</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>Pillar 3: Organized Crime</td>
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<td>Pillar 5: Law Enforcement</td>
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Strategic Pillar 1
Hard Core Terrorism

Hard core terrorism involves the deliberate use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. This includes but not limited to the activities such as: (a) biological terrorism or bioterrorism using the weapons of biological warfare; (b) chemical terrorism using the chemical agents of chemical warfare to undermine the personal security of citizens; (c) cyber-terrorism for assault on electronic communication networks; (d) narcoterrorism to finance terrorist activities by participation in the drug trade and trafficking; and (e) nuclear terrorism using nuclear device by a terrorist organization to cause massive devastation or using (or threat to use) fissionable radioactive materials for the purpose or assaulting the nuclear power plants, research and development centers.
### Strategic Pillar 1: Hard Core Terrorism:

#### Policy and Institutional Development

1. Inclusive, socially cohesive and participatory policy and institutional development process involving all the stakeholders with a view to ensuring that the policy, legal and structural frameworks are coherent, internally integrated, conceptually sound and widely owned.

2. Evidence-based empirical research on all issues related to terrorism including law, public administration, public policy, institutions and criminal justice system.

3. Institutional linkage among the academia, practice community as well as research and legislative community through the establishment of policy related think tanks.

4. A precise legal definition of terrorism and its scope is absolutely

#### Monitoring and Accountability

1. Parliamentary oversight and accountability system in terms of Committees and Commissions be fully operationalised to regularly review the performance of LEAs and agencies involved in counter-terrorism and hold them accountable for lack of performance, if any.

2. Role of NACTA, national coordination and monitoring agency be strengthened.

3. Its placement with PM office to exercise the accountability function and holding the national and the provincial agencies responsible for producing results and meeting agreed targets.

4. The trial of cases by the special courts be monitored on daily basis by NACTA for corrective measures, if any, through formal legal channels.

5. The funding sources of terrorists and terrorist outfits should be tracked

#### Citizen/Government Synergy

1. The inclusiveness and participation of the citizens in designing the policy and legislative frameworks as well as operational and implementation measures secures their buy-in is essential as it ensures that (a) the grant of the extra ordinary national security powers against acts of terrorism is a conscious collective decision; (b) the use of extra ordinary powers against groups of foreign belligerents and the local terrorists is legitimate; (c) the danger of militarizing the country as well as abuse of these powers to the detriment of the citizens can be eliminated; (d) the fundamental constitutional rights including those of minorities and marginalized groups will be respected and protected; and (e) they have a duty to actively play their role in assisting

#### Resource Mobilization

1. As a strict policy prescription, a minimum essential threshold for budgetary allocations should be made for counter-terrorism activities. These allocations should be based on the quantum and gravity of the risks and threats of terrorism and the potential for terrorist attacks. A criterion for the purpose should be developed in consultation with all the agencies involved in the counter terrorism effort.

2. A strict monitoring of the use of human, financial and systemic resources be carried out to curb and control inefficient resource utilization and facilitate need and priority based disbursements.

3. A separate head of account and line of budget should be provided for research and analytical work on terrorism so as to facilitate informed policy

#### National Action Plan

2. Execution of convicted terrorists


11. Ban on glorification of terrorism and terrorist organisations through print and electronic media.

12. FATA Reforms.


19. Policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees.

20. Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system
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<tr>
<td>1. It should be categorized as a Federal offence.</td>
<td>and monitored both from internal and external sources. Their sources of funds should be chocked through legal and banking regulations as well as aggressive diplomacy and international cooperation.</td>
<td>the government to combat terrorism.</td>
<td>making and institutional adjustments rather than the existing ad hoc and reactive culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. In view of operation Zarb-e-Azb and the establishment of military courts under the 21st amendment, there is a pressing need for the Government to <strong>make a clear distinction between the law of peace and the law of armed conflict.</strong> This distinction is well recognized in international law (Article 14 of ICCPR and General Comment No. 32 of the UN Committee on Human Rights) but has not yet been developed in Pakistan.</td>
<td>2. The print and electronic media including social media should be closely monitored by PEMRA to ensure swift action against glorification of terrorists acts and organizations.</td>
<td>3. The establishment of local government institutions through fair and free elections will help mitigate the sense of alienation and estrangement among a large number of citizens. This will help interest mediation and conflict resolution; prevent ethnicity based terrorism and violence; and elicit active support and cooperation from all citizens of Pakistan in fighting terrorism.</td>
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<td>6. The domestic law of Pakistan contains various provisions that authorize the use and conduct of force and includes Articles 245 and 256 of the Constitution, the Army Act 1952, Section</td>
<td>7. Possible misuse of authority to infringe freedom of press and electronic media be checked.</td>
<td>4. Establish and encourage non-state and pluralist institutions, mechanism and forums for the interest groups and wider societal segments to participate in the decision-making to solidify a sense of</td>
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### Strategic Pillar 1: Hard Core Terrorism:

#### Policy and Institutional Development

121 of the PPC, Action in Aid of Civil Powers Regulations 2011, Police Act etc. However, there is a need to consolidate and upgrade these laws based on a clear policy and reflective of the standards of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) which constitutes the law of armed conflict. This may require the establishment of a national IHL committee consisting of officials from the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Law & Justice and Interior to review and revise the domestic laws in accordance with the National Security concerns as well as Pakistan’s international obligations. It may be noted that national IHL committees exist in over a hundred countries worldwide.

7. The abolition of feudalism in its current form and imposition of agricultural income tax can help achieve the state of equal citizenship especially in the rural areas. Fully engaged free citizens would have stakes in the system and would have interest in protecting the basic freedoms and hence will be active partners in eliminating terrorism.

8. The establishment of Special trial courts under the supervision of Army through the 21st Constitutional amendment of 2015 including article 175, for speedy trials seems to be a move in the right direction.

9. Only the high profile hard core terrorism cases should be transferred to these courts for trial and disposal for exclusive focus on terrorism.

10. These court, with two years duration, as per the 21st Constitutional amendment, are not a sustainable solution;

11. Pakistan needs to gear its existing criminal justice framework towards effectively combating terrorism. This framework is currently subject to a patchwork of laws that have been repeatedly amended and have created a complex and conflicting framework. This entails a holistic and integrated reform and revamping of the existing CJS in terms of HR capacity; systems development; process and procedural improvement for speedy and effective disposal of hard core terrorist crimes, court management mechanisms, methodologies for preventative detention, initiatives to counter terrorist financing, special police powers, and upgraded mechanisms for the proscription and treatment of extremist organizations. (CVE in accordance with UNSC Resolution 2178)

12. The proposed legislation may also provide for the establishment of multiple Joint Investigation Units with active interagency participation (FIA, Police, ISI, IB, etc.), aimed at the long-term surveillance and investigation of specific terrorist entities and bringing to justice entire terrorist organizations, especially top leadership and masterminds.

13. At present there is a lack of uniformity in the application of the Police laws amongst the various provinces and territories of Pakistan. The Police Order 2002 is operating in Punjab, KPK, and AJK whereas the Police Act 1861 is operating in the Federal Capital and Sindh. Baluchistan, on the other hand, has its own Police Act of 2011. This state of affairs creates confusion regarding the legal mandate of the police. Reforms thus are needed to establish uniformity in the legal mandate of the police force and policing methodologies between the provinces. Given that extremist organizations often operate across provincial and international boundaries, such uniformity will improve the functioning of the police and enable them to better investigate and apprehend terrorists, targeting not only specific terrorists but also the organizations behind them.
Strategic Pillar 1: Hard Core Terrorism:

Policy and Institutional Development

14. Reforms of anti-terrorism institutions including provincial Crime Investigation Departments/Counter Terrorism Departments/DICs to enhance their operational capacity for tracking, investigating and preventing terrorist attacks and activities.

15. NACTA be made effectively operational with a reinforced central coordination role of: providing policy guidance to the provincial governments; sharing of information and intelligence between the civil and military agencies; threats assessment and response preparedness; and implementation of NISP and NAP. Its placement with the Prime Minister's office will give it the necessary operational efficacy and supremacy.

16. The provincial Apex Committees constituted security and NAP coordination should become fully functional to implement NAP especially when 15 points out of 20 points pertain to provincial governments.

17. Ensure that dedicated counter-terrorism force does not add to the multiplicity of institutions engaged in counter terrorism rather unifies the command and control structure with robust operational coordination including with military intelligence agencies;

18. The existing resources and structures such as Elite Force in Punjab and other Rapid Response Forces be efficiently deployed for prioritized, focused and targeted action against the terrorists and their networks.

19. Existing laws and legal and policy frameworks especially FATA regulations be reviewed to identify the gaps and loopholes which the terrorists tend to invoke and seek refuge under.

20. The gaps be filled on a priority basis either through amending the existing laws or promulgating the new ones.

21. New instruments, however, should be internally consistent and complementary to the existing frameworks.

22. More specific to FATA, the August 2011 Presidential Ordinance regarding FATA reforms package be reinforced and augmented for implementation.

23. Similarly in light of FATA reform commissioned by KPK Governor, a comprehensive plan of action along with the necessary resource kitty be launched for time-bound implementation.

24. The policy on dealing with the Afghan refugees should be formulated in the broader anthropological and cultural context and cross border affinities and dependencies between the Pakistani tribal areas and adjoining Afghanistan tribal belt. It should be a part of strategic relationship between the countries which need to be redefined in line with the geo-political and geo-strategic complementary between the two countries and the huge potential of becoming a regional economic hub.

25. The possibility of establishing a joint Tribal Areas Development Authority between the two countries should be actively explored for socio-economic uplift of the people as well as integrating people from these areas in the mainstream political, decision and policy making processes

26. Pakistan, instead of being apologetic, should project its role and experience in combating terrorism and offer its assistance to the countries confronting terrorism to fight this menace.
Religious Extremism is generally described as the strong ideological commitment of people who – for reasons they themselves deem religious – commit, promote or support purposely hurtful, violent or destructive acts against others. It stems from deeply embedded theological, historical, political, social and psychological roots and perspectives passionately espoused by its adherents. Certain system of ideas and beliefs characterise religious extremists across a variety of religious traditions. In recent times, the worst manifestations of religious militancy have involved some combination of the following:

- Idealisation of some past era combined with the belief that the world has gone awry;
- Declared certainty of the correctness of one’s religious vision;
- Complete unwillingness to compromise with those who disagree;
- Powerful denunciation of people with different lifestyles, especially when they involve and espouse liberal values;
- Devaluation of events in this world and an intense focus on life after death;
- Routine acceptance of the desired ends as justification for unsavoury means;
- Adoption of numerous defensive methods for avoiding serious encounters with conflicting systems of belief and their adherents;
- Dehumanising imagery of non-believers and religious outgroups,

Militancy is the state or condition of being combative, prone to be violent or disposed to fight and generally engenders from perceived discord between the interests of militants and the state. It is (a) grievance-motivated in terms of a violent protest to press demand for change, (b) adversarial in the sense that its targets are intransigent adversaries, to be pressured and if possible defeated by means of struggle, (c) confrontational in the sense that, rather than avoiding conflict and seeking accommodation and compromise, it seeks to initiate or intensify conflict and (d) collectively carried in that it is not, or at least not in the typical cases, performed by individuals acting alone, but by participants in socio-political struggles, acting in concert with their fellow insurgents.
### Strategic Pillar 2: Religious Extremism and Militancy

**Policy and Institutional Development**

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<tr>
<th>27. Faith based violence and terrorism has foundation in a narrative of hate based on highly elaborate and sophisticated logical deduction and employment of most effective rhetorical devices. In order to counter this narrative, more rigorous and sophisticated approach is needed. It is therefore recommended that sound basic research should be conducted about the existing narrative, possible counter narrative and effective rhetorical methods of conveying it to an average person. A counter narrative produced after such rigor would have a higher probability of achieving its target of hitting terrorism where it would be most effective.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Monitoring and Accountability</strong></td>
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<td>9. The possibility of registration of Madrasas under the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act of 1997 should be explored in addition to their compulsory registration under the Societies Registration Act etc.</td>
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<td>10. A mechanism for monitoring their activities and evaluation of their annual reports on a compulsory bases be instituted and those involved in false reporting should be awarded exemplary punishments.</td>
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<td>11. As stated elsewhere also, a rigorous monitoring of their funding resources - external as well as internal, should be undertaken by involving the State Bank of Pakistan and through regional and international cooperation and agreements on money laundering and illicit financing.</td>
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<td><strong>Citizen/Government Synergy</strong></td>
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<td>4. The universalism of Islam as a religion of peace, equality, tolerance and peaceful co-existence as well as its indictment of killing of innocent lives should be propagated through a well-articulated media and awareness campaign to elicit societal support against religious terrorism and militancy.</td>
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<td>5. Moreover, electronic and print media should be used effectively to convey the messages of harmony, civilized behavior, citizenship, laws, mutual respect and sanctity of life, honor and property as envisaged in the Constitution.</td>
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<td>6. A counter narrative to refute Deoband narrative with logic, reason and argument should be developed, owned at the highest political level and disseminated vertically and horizontally through state and non-state actors and citizens’ entities to inculcate a</td>
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<td><strong>Resource Mobilization</strong></td>
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<td>4. Adequate resources should be allocated to the LEAs and other agencies involved in countering religious extremism through performance and needs based budgeting with internally consistent monitoring arrangements.</td>
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<td>5. While a large majority of Madrasas are reportedly not involved in terrorist activities, yet there is a need for massive reforms to mainstream the Madrasas in the formal education system and at the same time checking the Madrasas fomenting extremism and hatred.</td>
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<td>6. The financing of religious extremism and terrorism, both domestic and external, needs to be checked and chocked through capacity building of Ministry of Finance and institution of special investigation teams comprising State Bank of Pakistan, Federal Board of Revenue and Federal</td>
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**Strategic Pillar 3: Strategic Pillars**

3. Ensure no armed militias are allowed to function in the country. 
5. Countering hate speech and extremist material. 
9. Taking effective steps against religious persecution. 
10. Registration and regulation of Madrasas. 
17. Balochistan reconciliation. 
18. Dealing firmly with sectarian terrorists.
### Strategic Pillar 2: Religious Extremism and Militancy

|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| enforcement agencies and other regulatory authorities should be strengthened to ensure targeted monitoring of Madrassas’ activities and source and utilization of finances.  
**29.** Violence and militancy, over the year because of governance dysfunction, absence of rule of law and selective justice, have become an acceptable reality of daily life. In addition to enforcing uniform and unbiased application of law, anti-violence should be made a part of the curricula at elementary and secondary levels of school education to inculcate values of tolerance, co-existence and respect for law.  
**30.** Militancy in all its forms stemming out of religious dogma, sub-nationalism, communal, regulation of print and electronic media including CDs, books, literature etc., by the District, Provincial and National government authorities on a regular and assiduous basis be ensured.  
**13.** The Federal Ministry of Religious Affairs in conjunction with the Provincial Education Departments and the Religious Institutions and seats of learning of repute should prescribe a curriculum design and approval mechanism for the Madrassahs implementation of which should be closely monitored and those found guilty of aberration held accountable under the law for inference.  
**14.** Involvement of the local communities in the management of Madrassahs and running their affairs should be made compulsory through their representation on the culture of religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence.  
**7.** This needs to be accompanied by advancing and promoting pluralist fora for the citizens to have a sense of participation in the political, economic and social spheres and to mitigate the sense of alienation and general grievance. | Investigation agency.  
**7.** The international fora and diplomatic efforts should be fully utilized to check the financial flows from some of the Islamic countries which promote particular brands of religion and religious sects |
Section V: Strategic Pillars

### Strategic Pillar 2: Religious Extremism and Militancy

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<td>ethnicity or politics, should be dealt with through comprehensive and internally consistent policy frameworks and/or strengthening the existing legal frameworks. These frameworks should address: the operations by foreign militant organizations based in Pakistan; Pakistani militant outfits operating abroad; and Pakistani militant organizations perpetrating terrorist activities inside Pakistan. These frameworks should also ensure elimination of sectarian and religious extremism material from the course curricula of Madrassas and religious institutions. <strong>31.</strong> The reconciliation process initiated through dialogue and development effort to appease and curb militancy in Baluchistan should continue and</td>
<td>Madrassas management committees and boards <strong>15.</strong> Media, despite being independent and free, has to exercise caution and restraint and act responsibly keeping in view the urgency and dictates of effectively combating terrorism. The space afforded to the terrorist's narrative by a hyper-active and dramatic media is likely to intimidate and stifle the initiative and actions of a nation state at the forefront of global counter-terrorism effort. <strong>The media has to be thus sensitized and at the same time itself evolve a code of practice, ethics and conduct which allows the state to effectively combat terrorism without being unnecessarily put to media trial.</strong></td>
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Strategic Pillar 2: Religious Extremism and Militancy

Policy and Institutional Development

32. The major Political Parties and the Religious organizations should take the lead on their own to shun and disown their militant arms in practical terms going beyond the political rhetoric.

33. Religious extremism located in the Pashtun and Saraiki belts also have an ethnic dimension of identity politics, which need to be discussed and taken into account while making decisions about dealing with them.

34. Equal and progressive opportunities of employment and self-employment should be provided and every effort must be made for economic uplift and improvement of the standard of life of all citizens with focus on minimizing the rural-urban differential, to alleviate the sense of injustice and prevent violent behavior.

35. Several international legal instruments - including UNSC Resolutions 1267, 1373 and 2178 - bind Pakistan to take positive steps towards countering terrorism. Pakistan is thus legally bound to address the root causes of terrorism, inter alia, by de-radicalizing extremist elements and winning back their loyalty. A National De-Radicalization Policy needs to be formulated with complementing legislative and socio-economic package that would comprehensively address the radicalization of Pakistani citizens and provide measures to remedy the same.

36. This policy and legislative framework needs to review and revise taught curricula in schools and madrassahs, institute prison reform to ensure that hardened criminals and extremists do not use such institutions as recruitment centers, review religious literature and sermons to prevent these media from advocating anti-State rhetoric, establish rehabilitation centers, and ensure vocational training and economic revival in high-threat areas. This policy would contribute towards reducing the space for radicalized elements operating in the society.

37. De-radicalization centers need to be established along with the accompanying legislative cover to enable the State to de-radicalize the captured extremists and bring them back into the mainstream.

38. A national media policy must also be instituted, focusing on attracting moderate and liberal scholars - both religious and secular - to counter terrorist narratives.
Strategic Pillar 3
Organized Crime

Organised crimes comprise unlawful activities strategically and systematically undertaken by a group or a ring to commit fraud, extortion, blackmail illicit financing and loan-sharking, political corruption, land grabbing, drug and narcotics manufacture and sale, human trafficking, arms smuggling etc. The criminals and their organisations seek to elicit support from some of society’s powerful members — especially people in the judiciary, police forces, and legislature — through bribery, blackmail, and the cultivation of mutually dependent relationships with legitimate businesses. Thus they are integrated into lawful society, shielded by corrupted law officers and politicians — and legal counsels.
### Strategic Pillar 3: Organized Crime

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<td>39. The strong nexus between terrorism and organized crime has added an ominous dimension to the enormity of the challenge. There is a need to carry research and in-depth analyses of the nexus between the organized crime, particularly, money laundering, illicit financing, kidnapping for ransom, drug-weapon-human trafficking and terrorism with a view to precisely identifying the problem areas and put in place policy and legislative frameworks to plug the possible leakages and effectively prevent generation or transfer of the resources from organized crime to finance terrorist activities. This should be one of the priority items of the rejuvenated NACTA research agenda.</td>
<td>16. The data from NADRA, telecommunication authorities, financial institutions, FBR and crime fighting agencies should be accessible to the LEAs for identifying and monitoring the incidence of fiscal crimes.</td>
<td>8. Adequate resources should be provided to build capacity (specialization, training, technology, etc.) of LEAs and police force to tackle organized crime.</td>
<td>16. Taking the ongoing operation in Karachi to its logical conclusion</td>
<td>9. Special allocation of research funds be made to NACTA to study the connect between the organized crime and terrorism and recommend policy choices and measures to curb and control organized crime and break the nexus between organized crime and terrorism.</td>
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Strategic Pillar 3: Organized Crime

Policy and Institutional Development

40. Policy and legislative frameworks need to be promulgated, or if already existing, strengthened to thwart illicit financing and money laundering making sure these are given adequate focus especially by the law enforcement agencies and the financial institutions.

41. The Institutions and state apparatus involved in controlling illicit financing and other organized crimes should be strengthened by investing them with the necessary skills and competence mix, systems and mechanisms and tools and infrastructure so that increased transparency, accountability and integrity in government institutions and services will be instrumental in curtailing the commission of organized crime.

42. Similarly capacity building of parliamentarians, Civil Society Organizations and media is essential to address the incidence of organized crime and better exercise oversight and accountability functions to prevent such crimes as also oversee the performance of the related agencies.

43. Pakistan should benefit from the global experience in the field of money laundering, drug trafficking and weapons smuggling to identify what worked and what did not work and contextualize this experience to the local conditions.

44. Advocacy and awareness action plans at national, provincial and local levels should be developed and implemented to sensitize the people about the immensity of the adverse impact of particularly money laundering and illicit financing on the social and development agenda.
The role of law enforcement services has evolved rapidly over the last two decades. Traditional approach to law enforcement entailed developing responsive capacity to address an incoming request coupled with some peripheral surveillance capability. In Pakistan, even that capacity was limited owing to poor training and work-force development, hackneyed and obsolete techniques and technology for investigation, cursory intelligence/information gathering and prosecution, meager resources and obsolete infrastructure, widely pervasive dysfunction in the entire gamut of human resource management of civilian law enforcement agencies including inefficient recruitment, performance-incentive misalignment and career growth. External environment, however, has totally transformed in recent times with new emerging threats to national security posed by terrorism, interweaving with a complex web of organized crime including kidnapping for ransom, drug trafficking, illegal arms trading, illicit financing etc. Similarly the need for illegal cross-border flow of finances and introduction of complicated tax regimes have given rise to more sophisticated fiscal crimes such as tax evasion and money laundering.
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<td><strong>45.</strong> Norms of ethical and professional behavior together with competence, motivation and integrity should be inculcated in the LEAs to improve their productivity for results as also to ensure uniform, unbiased application of law.</td>
<td><strong>20.</strong> Results based management should be introduced in all the LEAs and anti-terrorism agencies to monitor their performance against objectives and results given in their work plan.</td>
<td><strong>8.</strong> Citizens committees or local representation in the LEAs oversight mechanisms should be ensured with a view to creating better synergy between LEAs and the citizens and also give them a sense of participation and ownership in the efforts to counter terrorism. For the purpose, community and civil society based organizations should be strengthened and sensitized about their possible but very strong role in combating terrorism.</td>
<td><strong>11.</strong> Adequate funding should be provided to establish: a network of and upgrade the forensic laboratories; national database; and modernizing the training institutions including training curricula, physical infrastructure, quality of the trainers etc.</td>
<td><strong>4.</strong> Strengthening and activation of NACTA.</td>
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<td><strong>46.</strong> The HR policies, including selection, deployment, development and performance assessment enshrined in the relevant personnel codes should be strictly followed without exception to ensure merit based recruitment and performance based career progression.</td>
<td><strong>21.</strong> The Performance Evaluation and Reporting system to assess the performance of individual officials should be implemented objectively with reward and incentive for good performance and appropriate corrective/disciplinary action for those who need improvement or performed poorly.</td>
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<td><strong>20.</strong> Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system.</td>
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<td><strong>47.</strong> All LEAs and anti-terrorism agencies should develop skills-competence profiles for the major functional areas based on the evolving terrorist techniques and methods and prepare staff development plans or the</td>
<td><strong>22.</strong> External monitoring mechanisms by the executive, the judiciary and the legislature must be structured and institutionalized in a manner that they are not intrusive but at the same time prevent excesses by LEAs.</td>
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Section V: Strategic Pillars
Section V: Strategic Pillars

| Strategic Pillar 4: Technology, Training, Workforce Development |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Policy and Institutional Development** | **Monitoring and Accountability** | **Citizen/Government Synergy** | **Resource Mobilization** | **National Action Plan** |
| existing workforce to be able to befittingly assume roles and responsibilities for countering terrorism. | **23.** The politicization of bureaucracy in administration and LEAs should be stopped forthwith in terms of appointments, transfers, postings and promotions. | | | |
| **48.** Professional degrees/diplomas be made mandatory or made preferable for appointment of ASIs and others. | | **24.** The ICT tools should be fully utilized for transparency and objectivity in the conduct of public business; establishing complaints procedures for citizens to record their grievances; and making known to the citizens’ actions taken on their complaint. | | | |
| **49.** The relevant training institutes including those involved in the post selection training, mid-term development and higher level training courses for all levels of work force should develop special course modules for dealing with terrorism and organized crime. | **25.** Officials performing specialist functions like investigation, even driving need to have certifications of qualifications that need to be renewed annually | | | |
| **50.** The systems and SOPs should be clearly defined and updated based on crime prevention, detection, indictment and prosecution to ensure that technical and legal lacunae are not exploited by the criminals and terrorists to escape the writ of law. | | | | |
**Strategic Pillar 4: Technology, Training, Workforce Development**

**Policy and Institutional Development**

51. The parallel structures and new power centers must not be created in ad hoc and arbitrary manner or succumbing to the will of interest groups.

52. The LEAs and the anti-terrorism agencies should be equipped with modern high-tech devices and techniques for collection and authenticity of electronic and forensic evidence.

53. The audio-video equipment and the use of ICT tools should be utilized to link the prisons and the trial courts for speedy and secure disposal of terrorism cases.

54. Good practices to curb organized crimes including illicit financial flows should constitute a part of the SOPs.

55. Technical assistance from the donors to: design and conduct training for the respective authorities; installation and institution of modern tools, techniques and equipment; and terrorism specific preventive, monitoring investigative, combative systems be mobilized.

56. The concept of legal indemnity for civil servants needs to be revived to empower the government officials to take bold and proactive initiatives (This indemnity was originally provided for in the Civil Servants Act 1973 but has, in the past two decades or so, been watered down by decisions of the superior judiciary and activist prosecutions on behalf of NAB). This has resulted in an executive paralysis, with civil servants taking an overly cautious approach to their duties.
Law enforcement is dedicated to upholding and enforcing the laws and statutes that are currently in force and discovering, deterring, rehabilitating, or punishing persons who violate those laws and statutes. At its core, law enforcement seeks to achieve two goals: first, to prevent the occurrence of a crime; and second, to ensure suspected criminals are tried in a manner that is in compliance with the laws in vogue.

Law enforcement agencies tend to be limited to operating within a specified jurisdiction and mandated area of operation. A number of agencies based on their specialization, expertise and organizational alignment are generally involved in carrying out the law enforcement which may lead to a complex cobweb of roles and relationships characterized by jurisdictional overlap, policy and institutional fragmentation, turf war and coordination dysfunction.

The law enforcement capacity development is sine qua non for establishing rule of law, enforcing the writ of the state and combating and curbing acts of terrorism, organized crime and militancy and religious extremism. The lack of coherent policy and legal frameworks, inadequacy of robust institutional mechanisms, inadequate internal and external monitoring and accountability systems, paucity of resources and lack of synergy and credibility with the citizens tend to severely compromise the operational ability of the law enforcement agencies. There is a need to address all these bottlenecks to ensure that law enforcement capacity gets beefed up and government develops the necessary wherewithal to ensure rule of law and establish its writ to manage day-to-day crime, as also deal with the threat of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.
### Section V: Strategic Pillars

#### Strategic Pillar 5: Law Enforcement

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<td><strong>57.</strong> Institutional design and legal framework of LEAs should be based on sound professional logic and well-grounded rigorous research. The ad hocism in establishing the parallel institutions and politicization of bureaucracy or administration should be stopped forthwith. A transformative change of institutions into a sustainable paradigm is absolutely necessary for LEAs to function without recurrent changes prompted by expediency. <strong>58.</strong> This process will enable LEAs to follow a natural learning curve, avoid the pitfalls of administrative vacuum and ensure effective instrumentation. <strong>59.</strong> Military courts are a short term band-aid solution which cannot lead to stable institutional arrangement for law enforcement. As earlier stated, a sustainable CJS capable of effectively and</td>
<td><strong>26.</strong> The social construct of law enforcers as more equal than the fellow citizens which seeps deep in the functioning of law enforcers making them oblivious of their responsibility toward and accountability to the people, has to be transformed to &quot;duty to serve and protect&quot; and &quot;responsive toward citizens&quot; motto. <strong>27.</strong> Internal monitoring systems of LEAs must be implemented systematically and solely on professional bases without any bias or extraneous influence. The &quot;net worth&quot; of an official to the system should constitute as one of the major criterion for performance assessment. <strong>28.</strong> PERs are just one method of internal monitoring. The checks and balances on the powers and authorities of LEAs by involving citizens and transparency through use of ICT technology should be systematically built into</td>
<td><strong>11.</strong> The perspective of the governance and law enforcement agencies to view the population they serve as the general public needs to be changed as this labeling strips the citizens of their rights and duties as individuals and creates an anonymous right-less mass with no clear identities and social status. <strong>12.</strong> Citizen buy-in is absolute imperative for the law enforcement function and rule of law to be established. An enlightened and informed citizenry engaged through inclusive and participatory process is an asset for LEAs in terms of terrorism and crime prevention, control and eradication. <strong>13.</strong> The establishment of level local government institutions and pluralist platforms and forums can help create societal ownership of the policies, decisions and actions</td>
<td><strong>14.</strong> Resource allocation to LEAs must be prioritized based on the gravity of the risk/threat and need as well as operational functions of LEAs instead of terrorism. A minimum threshold of allocation to sustain operational capability must be earmarked for the purpose. <strong>15.</strong> The prudent and creative use of existing and potential resources such as community intelligence, community policing and neighborhood-watch could, to a great extent, address the overall resource needs of LEAs</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> Execution of convicted terrorists <strong>3.</strong> Ensure no armed militias are allowed to function in the country. <strong>7.</strong> Ensuring against re-emergence of proscribed organisations. <strong>9.</strong> Taking effective steps against religious persecution. <strong>10.</strong> Registration and regulation of madrassas. <strong>11.</strong> Ban on glorification of terrorism and terrorist organisations through print and electronic media. <strong>13.</strong> Dismantling communication networks of terrorist organisations. <strong>14.</strong> Measures against abuse of internet and social media for terrorism. <strong>15.</strong> Zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab. <strong>16.</strong> Taking the ongoing operation in Karachi to its logical conclusion. <strong>18.</strong> Dealing firmly with sectarian terrorists.</td>
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### Strategic Pillar 5: Law Enforcement

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| timely addressing terrorism needs to be put in place as an exit strategy of the special military courts.  
**60.** The possibility of re-instituting the executive magistracy for effective law enforcement and as the initial executive remedy should be seriously examined.  
**61.** Stability will come with long-term reasonable functioning of institutions, not only LEAs but also those related to health, education, civic amenities, transportation, etc. to ally genuine complaints and concerns and frustration among citizens helping prevent crime, violence and terrorism.  
**62.** Selective administrative and civil and criminal justice, invariably contributes to and creates space for spread of terrorism narrative. The rule of law and its uniform application should be strictly ensured.  
**63.** The new laws should their everyday functioning and operations.  
**29.** Structured and systematic modes of external monitoring of LEAs by the executive, judiciary and legislature must be designed after due care, caution and research in a manner so that an effective system of checks and balances while exercising monitoring and accountability function, does not hinder the regular professional functioning of any arm of the government or the LEAs.  
**30.** Local government institutions and non-state institutions should be encouraged to objectively monitor the functioning of LEAs and a reporting system designed with clearly laid out procedures for the supervisory staff to take due cognizance of dysfunctions, if any, with feedback to the originator. This would entail institution of mechanisms and fora for meaningful external accountability by media against terrorists and preventing them from establishing their safe havens and roots in the society.
**Strategic Pillar 5: Law Enforcement**

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<td>be enacted only in exceptional cases in view of the availability of comprehensive legal framework; it should be targeted toward interests of the state and rectifying the specific aberration. The primacy of state and coherent legal infrastructure will aid tremendously in eliminating terrorism. <strong>64.</strong> The coordination deficit among prosecutors, police and judges in the Criminal Justice System has emerged as a major problem in the wake of abolition of the institution of District Magistrate. Its revival along with the executive magistracy should be seriously considered with clear delineation of roles and responsibilities. <strong>65.</strong> The decision for execution of convicted terrorists should be implemented on immediate basis. The higher judiciary should be sensitized about the and civil society. <strong>31.</strong> A transparent and easily accessible central data base, inter alia, indicating the performance of LEAs based on Key Performance Indicators should be established to enable the citizens gauge and assess the results achieved by LEAs on control of violence, organized crime and terrorism. This should be accompanied by publication of regular reports for public visibility and transparency. <strong>32.</strong> Periodical management and performance audits of criminal justice organizations should be institutionalized to identify gaps and take corrective actions. <strong>33.</strong> The independent institution of Ombudsman does not have the capacity to attend to all the complaints. This structure should be augmented with a network of complaint authorities/ commissions at local levels.</td>
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**Strategic Pillar 5: Law Enforcement**

**Policy and Institutional Development**

deterrence impact which the death sentence creates to prevent acts of terrorism. This is warranted because of the extra-ordinary and unprecedented threats and risks to the integrity of Pakistan as recognized in the 21st amendment of January 2015 to the Constitution and could be done without impairing the independence of judiciary.

**66.** The LEAs with the close involvement of local authorities should ensure that no armed militants are allowed to functions in the country. The role of the intelligence agencies to share and exchange information is of critical importance. Action taken against the militants and their incarcerations should be closely monitored through DCO/DM to ensure against abuse of authority and violation of fundamental rights.

**67.** The possible covert activities of the defunct organizations and its membership should be closely watched by LEAs to effectively prevent the possible resurgence of their activities.

**68.** The cybercrime and use of communication network and social media provide effective platforms for terrorists. The use of social media by the terrorists should be effectively curbed and their communication networks completely dismantled.

**69.** The Constitution of Pakistan as per articles 20 (freedom to profess, practice and propagate religion) and article 36 provides for the safeguard of the legitimate rights and interest of minorities. The protection of minorities and their legitimate rights should accordingly be ensured by the State.

**70.** Action against elements spreading sectarianism under the penal and special laws should be swiftly taken without exception ensuring uniformity and consistency in application of these laws. The government and LEAs, instead of “special campaigns”, ensure the establishment of rule of law as a mandatory obligation and duty in the ordinary conduct of their mandate and duties.

**71.** An indiscriminate action, irrespective of religious or political consideration or expediency should be taken against the militant outfits and armed gangs under the relevant penal, special and local laws to dismantle them and prevent their re-emergence.

**72.** Similarly, strict action against the literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, decapitation, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance should be taken by LEAs without let or loose.
CONCLUSION
The vulnerability of Pakistan to terrorism will continue to remain high at least in the medium term in view of the multiplicity of factors. These include the potential radicalization of wide range of alienated and misguided groups, perceived sense of political alienation and disenfranchisement by large segments and socio-economic deprivation and disparity. The external intervention both from the hostile countries as well as religious-cum-sectarian motivated intrusions of some of the so called friendly countries further exacerbates the situation.

The on-going military operation against the terrorists and their abettors has to continue till they and their networks are flushed out or weakened beyond resurgence. This has to be accompanied simultaneously with a comprehensive long term compact of political, social and economic actions on the internal front with focus on human capital development, access to social services, income generating activities and inclusive decision making.

At the same time comprehensive and coherent policy framework and robust institutions capable of sustainably responding to any or every threat of terrorism need to be established. The symmetry and balance between civil military relationships and intra-agency and inter-agencies dysfunctions have to be addressed to insure consensual, effective and speedy actions against the terrorism. A well thought out and calibrated foreign policy is also imperative to effectively check and eradicate terrorism and militancy and its fomentation by external hostile forces. The sustainable solution indeed lies in the unity of purpose and action not only as expressed by the highest level commitment and resolve of the political and military hierarchies but also through active engagement of all state and non-state actors. NAP and NISP are a step in the right direction, but we need to build on these progressively to eliminate terrorism in the face of complexity and magnitude of the phenomenon. The lukewarm implementation of these instruments will not yield sustainable results.

Toward this end, the Shahid Javed Burki Institute of Public Policy at NetSol has made an attempt to initiate the process. Hopefully, the government will take it forward and ensure that the necessary policy and legislative frameworks coupled with robust institutional mechanisms and operational plans will be put in place with speed and urgency to root out terrorism from the country and also to bequeath a stable, secure and peaceful Pakistan to the posterity. We owe this to those who have been martyred in the heroic fight against terrorism; to those who are still mourning deeply the untimely death of their near and dear ones; and above all to those millions of parents, children and citizens who, as a symbol of perseverance, courage and commitment, continue to endure and convey a strong message to terrorists: “we are not scared nor intimidated”.

Conclusion

Strategy to Combat Terrorism including Effective Implementation of National Action Plan
Annexes
Following is the text of National Security Policy 2014-18 draft:

1. This first ever National Internal Security Policy (NISP) is formulated to protect national interests of Pakistan by addressing critical security issues as well as concerns of the nation. It is based upon principles of mutual inclusiveness and integration of all national efforts and includes three elements viz): dialogue with all stakeholders, ii) isolation of terrorists from their support systems, iii) enhancing deterrence and capacity of the security apparatus to neutralise the threats to internal security of Pakistan. This requires integrated efforts through an institutionalised monitoring framework under democratic leadership to elicit support and cooperation of local and international stakeholders.

2. Global terrorism and armed conflict in Afghanistan have changed the internal security paradigm of Pakistan. Pakistan’s economy has suffered a loss of more than US$ 78 billion in last 10 years only. More than 50,000 Pakistanis, including civilian, Armed Forces and Law-Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) personnel, were affected or sacrificed their lives. This challenges the resolve and resilience of people of Pakistan for peace.

3. Internal Security Environment
   - Internal Security environment is dominated by non-traditional threats of extremism, sectarianism, terrorism and militancy. In present form, the internal security apparatus is inadequately equipped and enormously strained to tackle these threats. This elucidates the dire need for a comprehensive and inclusive response plan, as no single state agency is capable of dealing with such threats on its own.

Scope

4. Whereas it is critical to define the composite picture concerning threats to the national security, NISP essentially remains focused on Internal Security, (NIS) paradigm, however, would be incomplete without identifying its linkages with the external diplomatic initiatives and various other dimensions of human security, in some parts of the country hostile networks have also challenged the writ of the State. Nonetheless, national security apparatus including Ministry of Defence (MoD) is dealing with this situation under political oversight. Other, relevant State institutions will address social, economic, environmental and external security aspects.

Vision

5. Create a safe environment where life, property, civil liberties and socio-economic rights of the citizens are protected and the people of Pakistan are able to live and prosper in harmony, freedom respect and dignity as enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan.
Annexure 1 (Contd...)
National Security Policy of Pakistan 2014-18

17. Terrorism has not only affected the socio-cultural environment but it has also damaged the scarce existing infrastructure in Pakistan by way of frequent attacks on educational institutions, healthcare facilities, communication networks and supply of energy within the country. NACTA will coordinate all relevant agencies for fair assessment of losses, monitor and recommend plans for security infrastructure.

Rehabilitation

18. Sustainable and integrated development for rehabilitation of affected regions is fundamental in collaboration with respective provincial governments. Though such efforts are already in place but need vigorous follow up for timely implementation and quick impact. It will also ensure that victims of terrorism are provided sufficient support through similar programmes.

Towards this end, enormous support of various public and international organisations is available, but requires synergy and improved communication. NACTA will analyse the shortcomings of planning and execution and recommend appropriate strategies in this process. An integrated evaluation and monitoring mechanism shall be established within NACTA to coordinate the process of rehabilitation.

National Narrative

20. Constructing a robust national narrative on extremism, sectarianism, terrorism and militancy is the corner stone of an ideological response to non-traditional threats. Such a narrative is essential for coming up with common ideological denominators in a diverse society. Religious scholars, intelligentsia, educational institutions and media are the key stakeholders for constructing and disseminating the National Narrative. NACTA will facilitate a dialogue with all stakeholders to strengthen democratic values of tolerance respecting diversity of the society.

21. NACTA in consultation with other institutions supporting NISP will develop a National De-Radicalisation Programme.

Reconciliation

22. NACTA will devise strategy options in consultation with the experts and relevant departments for peace building with extremist elements and terrorist groups opting to submit to lawful authorities and reconcile their differences on key issues within the legal framework.

Reintegration

23. The reintegration aspect of CRP is a holistic people centric process. This has direct bearing on economic security of the citizens and it needs an integrated response from public, private and development sector and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).

24. First, it envisages a Youth Engagement Strategy (YES) imparting technical and vocational education, creating jobs and offering soft loans in collaboration with respective Provincial Governments to ensure decent livelihood opportunities for all.

25. Secondly this reintegration also envisions the incorporation of Madrassas in the mainstream educational framework. Understanding the critical role played by these institutions for a pluralistic society, it is important to integrate them within the national education system by supporting their administration, financial audit and curriculum accreditation. The same applies to other private educational institutions.

Legal Reforms

26. Implementing of NISP requires a comprehensive review of existing legal framework. This reform process will respond to imperatives of criminal justice and ensure the protection of fundamental rights of the citizens of Pakistan. Among other reforms in criminal justice, it also requires review of the regulatory capacity of the State to monitor, evaluate and prevent the misuse of existing laws under which mosques and Madrassas are functioning.

27. NACTA will conduct detailed research and consultation with relevant stakeholders including Ministry of Law & Justice, judiciary, police, prosecution, prisons and legal experts to recommend a futuristic legal framework capable of addressing all contingencies of NISP.

Composite Deterrence Plan

28. The National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA) suffers from inadequacies to identify the threat, analyse it and respond quickly at all tiers. Best practices suggest that CDP would remain elusive without synchronisation of national efforts and democratic oversight.

29. Despite all material constraints the overall performance of law-enforcement agencies is inconsistent and needs improvement. CDP will provide a consistent approach through integration of specialised skills and capabilities to combat the traditional and non-traditional threats to internal security. This needs restructuring and capacity building of NISA on urgent basis for enhanced service delivery of justice and security.

30. NISP aims of performance enhancement of existing apparatus and filling the capacity gaps of NISA by creating new but cost effective and efficient institutions. CDP works to change the posture of national internal security apparatus from reactive to proactive. The immediate objective is to eliminate growing menace of terrorism by, inter alia, filling the coordination gaps in intelligence regime to develop proactive systems.

31. While tackling non-traditional security threat, it would be imperative to address traditional threats by using conventional law-enforcement apparatus more effectively. Towards this end, identification and mapping of critical security threats to public is essential to...
articulate a response strategy under a unified command and control.

Contours of NISP
32. The contours of response mechanism of NISP hinge upon the major activities under taken by various stakeholders implementing the CRP and CDP.
33. Construct a national narrative on extremism, terrorism, sectarianism and militancy to dispel the wrong perceptions created by the terrorists on ideological basis by engaging media, civil society, organisations, overseas Pakistanis and international community to elicit support and cooperation.
34. Design and implement national de-radicalization programme for the people vulnerable to extremism that can be rehabilitated and reintegrated in the society.
35. Integrate the mosques and the Madrassas in the national and provincial educational establishment by mapping and thereafter mainstreaming the existing and new Madrassas and private sector educational institutions.
36. Develop social and physical infrastructure in extremism affected regions through sustained and inclusive efforts by all State institutions at Federal and provincial levels.
37. Rehabilitate all victims of terrorism especially vulnerable groups like women, children, elderly minorities and people with special needs.
38. Improve worsening law and order situation by eliminating trends of targeted assassinations, extortion, kidnapping for ransom and other serious and organised crime.
39. Ensure protection of key installations and places of national importance.
40. Enforce a comprehensive arms control regime across the country.
41. Prevent misuse of social, electronic and print media, mobile phone Sims and electronic devices and prevent cybercrimes for any purpose threatening internal security.
42. Integrate national data base and registration plan to identify people residing in Pakistan and their assets.
43. Design and implement plans to regulate lawful cross border movement of persons, goods, drugs and precursors, weapons or any other material threatening internal security.
44. Establish a modern, well equipped Federal Rapid Response Force (RRF) comprising of Counter-Terrorism Departments and police with experts from other security institutions with nationwide reach and capability to interface and operate in close coordination with police, CAFs and Pakistan Armed Forces.
45. Capacity building of DIS for collection, analysis and dissemination through integrated qualitative intelligence gathering efforts having direct bearing on internal security to develop operational capability of conducting intelligence based operations to contain, pre-empt and eliminate terrorism and other threats to public safety.
46. Establish a modern, well equipped Federal Rapid Response Force (RRF) comprising of Counter-Terrorism Departments and police with experts from other security institutions with nationwide reach and capability to interface and operate in close coordination with police, CAFs and Pakistan Armed Forces.
47. Reorganisation and activation of Counter-Terrorism Departments (CTD) within police organisation of all the provinces, Islamabad Capital Territory, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Azad Kashmir Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, preferably with uniform structure and unified command at provincial, region and field level.
48. All CTDs to comprise of intelligence, operation, investigation, Provincial Rapid Response Force (RRF) and other technical sections enabling themselves to tackle the entire spectrum of internal security threats including terrorism and subversive activities.
49. Modernisation of RRFs under CTDs with matching capabilities as that of Federal Response Force (RRF) for ensuring uniformity.
50. Establishment of a dedicated CAF Headquarter under MoI for integrated warder management and modernisation and coordination of CAFs, i.e. Pakistan Rangers (Punjab and Sindh), Frontier Corps (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan), Frontier Constabulary, Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts, Pakistan Coastal Guards and Anti-Narcotics Force.
51. Modernisation of Law-Enforcement components of Pakistan Customs decides Levies in FATA and Balochistan and other LEAs.
52. Making concerted diplomatic efforts for international cooperation to break transnational affiliations of terrorists through prevention of money laundering, organised crime and transnational movement of substances used in biological and chemical terrorism.
53. Modernisation of Law-Enforcement components of Pakistan Customs decides Levies in FATA and Balochistan and other LEAs.
54. Taking concerted diplomatic efforts for international cooperation to break transnational affiliations of terrorists through prevention of money laundering, organised crime and transnational movement of substances used in biological and chemical terrorism.
55. NACTA will liaise with international actors for fostering cooperation to counter-terrorism and extremism.
56. Peaceful resolution of disputes with all the sections of society is the cardinal principle of NISP, through
dialogues from position of strength.
57. Ministry of Interior is the lead Ministry for National Internal Security Policy implementation.
58. For NISP implementation, all CAFs will be directly responsible to MoI.
59. Each ministry, organisation, intelligence agency and department shall furnish such information and intelligence as solicited by NACTA and shall clearly outline and pursue a roadmap in support of NISP within 30 days.
60. Initiatives will be available for specialised functions at all levels for the organisations dedicated to NISP implementation.
61. Restructuring of MoI, police and CAFs and other LEAs will be undertaken to rationalise their mandate and resources to implement the NISP framework. Whereas all the existing well functioning structures will remain intact, any overlapping and or redundant units in police and CAFs will be diverted to fill the gaps in the relevant organisations.
62. Political consensus for NISP will be solicited through consultative process with all the stakeholders.
63. Public support for NISP will be solicited through all communication channels. Valuable suggestions and input from intelligentsia, media and CSOs will be invited by the NACTA for improvement in the NISP and mid-course corrections where needed.


- Security of Pakistan Act, 1952
- Probation of Offender Ordinance, 1960
- Allopathic System (Prevention of Misuse) Ordinance, 1962
- Indecent Advertisements Prohibition Act, 1963
- The Punjab Arms Ordinance 1965
- Airports Security Force Act, 1975
- The Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975
- Pakistan Railways Police Act, 1977
- (The Evidence Act) 1984
- Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1992
- The Anti Terrorism Act 1997
- Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance On October 24, 1998
- The Pakistan Armed Forces Ordinance 1999
## Annex 2

### Anti-Terrorism Acts

- Pafo Was Repealed On April 27, 1999
- The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2007
- The Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation, 2011
- The Investigation for Fair Trial Act 2012
- The Pakistan Protection Ordinance 2013
- National Counter Terrorism Authority Act, 2013

### Amendments to Anti-Terrorism Acts (1997) & Other Counter-Terrorism Acts

1. Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 1998
2. Pakistan Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 1999
3. Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1999
4. Anti-Terrorism (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1999
5. Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 2000
6. Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 2001
7. Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002
8. Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 2002
9. Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2004
10. Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) Act, 2004
11. Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) Act, 2005
12. Provincial Constitution Order No.1 of 2007 (PCO)
14. Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 2009
15. Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 2010
18. The investigation for Fair Trial Act, 2012
21. The Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) Act, 2013
22. Pakistan Protection Ordinance, 2013

### Laws to Counter Organized Crime

- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947
- Pakistan Names and Emblems (Prevention of Unauthorised Use) Act, 1957
- Dangerous Cargoes Act, 1953
- High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973
- Removal of Accused Persons Act, 1973
- Prevention of Anti-National Activities Act, 1974
- Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1975
- Contempt of Court Act, 1976
- Drugs Act, 1976.
- Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976.
- Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977
- Exits from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981.
- Traffic Offences (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1981
- Surrender of Illicit Arms Act, 1991
- Abolition of Punishment of Whipping Act, 1996
- Anti Narcotics Force Act, 1997
- Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997
- National Accountability Ordinance, 1999
Annexure

**Annex 2 (Contd...)**

**Anti-Terrorism Acts**

- Police Order 2002 (Amendment) Ordinance 2006
- Acid Control and Acid Crime Prevention Act 2010
- Investigation for Fair Trial Act, 2013

**Religious Laws**

- The Charitable Funds (Regulation Of Collections) Act, 1953 (Last Updated On 06-12-2003)
- The Punjab Historical Mosques And Shrines Fund Cess Ordinance, 1960 (Last Updated On 06-12-2003)
- The West Pakistan Muslim Personal Laws (Shariat) Act, 1962 (Last Updated On 06-12-2003)
- The Caste Disabilities Removal (West Pakistan Amendment) Act, 1963 (Last Updated On 06-12-2003)
- The Succession (West Pakistan Amendment) Ordinance, 1965 (Last Updated On 06-12-2003)
- The Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal Of Doubts) Ordinance, 1972 (Last Updated On 06-12-2003)
- The Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal Of Difficulties) Act, 1975 (Last Updated On 06-12-2003)
- The Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 (Last Updated On 06-12-2003)
- Enforcement Of Shari Ah Act, 1991
- The Charitable And Religious Trusts Act, 1920 (Last Updated On 28-02-2012)
- Pakistan Madrassas Education (Establishment And Affiliation Of Model DiniMadaras) Board Ordinance
## Annex 3:
### International Conventions Open to All States

| 1. | 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention) |
| 3. | 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage Convention or Montreal Convention) |
| 5. | 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention) |
| 11. | 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Terrorist Bombing Convention) |
| 12. | 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Terrorist Financing Convention) |

### Security Council Resolutions

| 15. | UN Security Council Resolution 731 (January 21, 1992) |
| 16. | UN Security Council Resolution 748 (March 31, 1992) |
| 17. | UN Security Council Resolution 883 (November 11, 1993) |

### Regional conventions

#### Europe

| 20. | 2006 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism |
| 21. | Commonwealth of Independent States |

#### The Americas

| 24. | Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism AG/RES. 1840 (XXXII-O/02) (Bridgetown, June 2002) |

#### Africa

| 27. | The ASEAN Convention On Counter Terrorism, Cebu, Philippines, 13 January 2007 [In force from 27 May 2011, on 22 January 2013 all ASEAN members signed the ACCT] |
| 28. | League of Arab States |

| 29. | Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Cairo, April 1998) |
Annexure

Annex 3 (Contd...)  
International Conventions Open to All States

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**Anti-terrorist legislation in the European Union**  
**European Union**

- 30. EU Framework Decision on Terrorism  
- 31. European Court of Human Rights cases related to anti-terrorist legislation  
- 32. Brogan and others v. the UK-November 1988)  
- Belgium  
- 33. Belgium Anti-Terrorism Act 2003  
- France  
- 34. The 19th century lois scélérates restricting freedom of expression.

**Ireland (Republic of)**

- 35. Offences against the State Acts 1939–1998 via the Special Criminal Court  
- 36. Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005

**Italy**

- 37. Further information: History of the Italian Republic  
- 38. Italy passed various anti-terrorist laws during the "years of lead" (anni di piombo) in the 1970s.
Annexure 4
Definitions of Terrorism

Pakistan
According to the MANUAL ON ANTI-TERRORISM ACT 1997, the definition of Terrorism reads as follows:
“A person is said to commit a terrorist act if he:
a) In order to, or if the effect of his actions will be to, strike terror or create a sense of fear and insecurity in the people, or any section of the people, does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive or inflammable substances, or such fire-arms or other lethal weapons as may be notified, or poisons or noxious gases or chemicals, in such a manner as to cause, or be likely to cause, the death of, or injury to, any person or persons, or damage to, or destruction of, property on a large scale, or a widespread disruption of supplies of services essential to the life of the community, or threatens with the use of force public servants in order to prevent them from discharging their lawful duties; or
b) Commits a scheduled offence, the effect of which will be, or be likely to be, to strike terror, or create a sense of fear and insecurity in the people, or any section of the people or to adversely affect harmony among different sections of the people; or
c) Commits an act of gang rape, child molestation, or robbery coupled with rape as specified in the Schedule to this Act; or
d) Commits an act of civil commotion as specified in section 7-A.”

United Nations
The UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) defines Terrorism as:
“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.
A UN panel, in March 17, 2005, described Terrorism:
“as any act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.”
It should be noted, however, that there is no agreed definition unanimously agreed by the member nations.

United States of America
Definitions of Terrorism in the U.S. Code differentiates between the “international terrorism” and “domestic terrorism” for purposes of Chapter 113B:
"International terrorism" means activities with the following three characteristics:
• Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law;
• Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
• Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.*
"Domestic terrorism" means activities with the following three characteristics:
• Involve acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law;
• Appear intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
• Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.

European Union
The European Union defines terrorism in Art. 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002). This provides that terrorist offences are certain criminal offences of serious nature against persons and property which:
given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.